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and Creators’ Human Rights 
 
Jonathan Griffiths 
 
It is sometimes suggested that authors’ rights1 are protected under international human rights 
law. This claim is often supported by reference to the “creators’ rights” 2 established under 
Article 27(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)3 and Article 15(1)(c) of 
the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)4. Article 27(2) 
of the UDHR is framed in the following terms: 
 
Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the 
author.5 
  
If authors’ rights, as established in international copyright law, were indeed human rights, 
claims to the universalism of copyright norms would be significantly reinforced as, in addition 
to the obligations imposed by international agreements such as the Berne Convention and 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS)6, states would assume 
duties to protect authors under human rights instruments. Such duties would not be limited by 
an author’s nationality, as is currently the case with international copyright agreements, and 
individual creators might, in certain circumstances, be entitled to bring proceedings directly 
against states for failure to comply with their obligations to protect creators’ rights.7 Within 
such a system, the concept of “creators’ rights” in human rights law would also be expected to 
play a role in shaping policy at international and national level, as an important element within 
a pluralist international acquis.8 
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1 The term “authors’ rights” is employed here to describe the rights granted to authors under international and 
national copyright/authors’ rights systems. In this chapter, “authors’ rights” and “copyright” are generally 
employed synonymously.  
2 The term “creators’ rights” is used to describe the rights provided to authors under UDHR, art. 27(2) and 
ICESCR, art. 15(1)(c), and equivalent provisions in human rights and constitutional documents. 
3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 Dec. 1948) A/RES/217(III) (hereinafter UDHR). 
4 International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (16 Dec. 1966) (hereinafter ICESCR). 
5 See sect. §25.01 infra for the text of art.15(1)(c). 
6 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (15 Apr. 1994), 1869 UNTS  299. 
7 Individual communications to the Committee on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights alleging violation of the 
ICESCR can be made against state parties which have ratified the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (10 Dec. 2008), A/RES/63/117; To date, only a relatively small minority 
of states have ratified the Optional Protocol; see, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/CESCRIndex.aspx (accessed 10 Jun. 2019). 
8 For discussion of the potential of such a pluralist copyright acquis, see Graeme W. Austin, Authors’ Human 
Rights & Copyright Policy Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 405 (2017); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, The 
Protection of Intellectual Property in International Law (Oxford University Press 2016); Graeme B. Dinwoodie 
& Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS (Oxford University Press 2012). 
Is it true, then, that the authors’ rights protected under copyright laws are synonymous with the 
creators’ rights protected in human rights law? If not, what is the relationship between the two 
sets of rights? These are the issues explored in this chapter. Section §25.01 outlines the 
argument that author’s rights are protected as human rights. It focuses on creators’ rights, but 
touches also on arguments that authors’ rights are encompassed within other generally 
recognized human rights, such as the right of freedom of expression and the right of property. 
The chapter then moves on to examine the scope of creators’ rights within international human 
rights law (§25.02), doing so by reference to the reports of the United Nations’ (UN) 
Committee of Economic, Social & Cultural Rights9 and the UN Human Rights Committee’s 
Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights.10 These emphasize significant distinctions 
between authors’ rights and creators’ rights and, as a consequence, challenge the universalist 
claim that human rights law provides fundamental reinforcement for the norms established in 
copyright law. 
 
Section §25.03 seeks to establish the known contours of the relationship between authors’ 
rights and creators’ rights. It is suggested that, while it is very difficult to argue that the 
copyright system as a whole is supported by the international obligation to protect creators’ 
rights, there are aspects of the current system which would appear to be based on human rights 
norms. Similarly, there are aspects of copyright law, at international and national level, which 
sit uneasily with the obligations assumed by states under Article 27(2) of the UDHR and Article 
15(1)(c) of the ICESCR. The chapter concludes by arguing that there is a significant (if 
unresolved) relationship between authors’ rights and creators’ rights, but that we currently do 
not have a mutually-supportive, pluralist copyright acquis in which the international copyright 
system is underpinned by the human rights of creators. Rather, as a matter of politics and 
doctrine, the two systems operate in relative isolation from one another. This situation is 
unlikely to change until, at very least, the scope and effect of creators’ rights is defined in 
greater detail. The means through which such clarification might be achieved are briefly 
considered.  
 
There has been relatively little written on creators’ rights in the human rights scholarship and 
the literature in copyright has focused predominantly on the history of Article 27(2) and Article 
15(1)(c) and their potential consequences for authors’ rights. This chapter seeks to break new 
ground by examining the nature of the relationship between these two forms of legal claim and, 
in particular, by asking whether it is possible to say, with any degree of certainty, that certain 
features of the law of authors’ rights are either required, or precluded, by international human 
rights law. 
 
§25.01 Authors’ Rights as Human Rights 
 
Human rights arguments have frequently been advanced by users of copyright works. 
Increasingly, however, authors and other right-holders have also begun to rely on human, or 
                                                 
9 See sect. §25.02[B] below. 
10 See sect.  §25.02[C] below. 
fundamental, rights in support of claims relating to works or other subject-matter. Sometimes 
such arguments are made in general terms, without linkage to specific rights recognized under 
international human rights instruments or under national constitutions.11 There is a clear 
relationship between such general claims and the universalist rationales of international 
copyright law.12 The Berne Convention, established with the intention of providing borderless 
rights for authors, has itself been described as a form of human rights document.13 However, 
arguments premised upon specific rights granted under international human rights law, or 
equivalent regional or national constitutional instruments, are now also commonly advanced.  
 
In a European context, property is the most obviously relevant right in this regard.14 Authors’ 
claims to be entitled to rely on the right of property have received particular support from the 
inclusion of a “right of intellectual property” in the European Union’s (EU) Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.15 In several Judgments of the Court of Justice, Article 17(2) has served 
to anchor the interests of authors and other rightholders within a framework of “fair balance”.16 
It has also provided a bulwark against unjustified interference with authors’ rights by national 
legislators.17 However, the right of property has significant limitations from the perspective of 
creators. It does not specifically recognize creativity, providing only a general guarantee of 
established legal entitlements (including the authors’ rights provided by law) against 
expropriation and other unjustified interference. Thus, for example, the right of property will 
not support of an author’s claim to legal protection where such protection has not previously 
been recognized in positive law.18  
 
Given property’s limitations in this respect, it is not surprising that attempts have also been 
made to establish a human rights foundation for authorship on other widely-recognized rights 
protected under international and domestic bills of rights. Thus, for example, the rhetorical 
description of copyright law as the “engine of free expression” 19 is often repeated and attempts 
are sometimes made to argue that authors’ rights reflect the right to freedom of expression as 
                                                 
11 For an example of such an enquiry, see Michel Vivant, Authors’ Rights, Human Rights 174 RIDA 60 (1997). 
12 For a discussion of the universalist foundations of authors’ rights, see Jane Ginsburg, From Hypatia to Victor 
Hugo to Larry and Sergey: All the World’s Knowledge and Universal Authors’ Rights British Academy Review 
39 (2013). 
13 See Berne Union Assembly, Solemn Declaration Commemorating the Centenary of the Berne Convention 
(27Jun. 1986), as reproduced in Copyright 373 (1986). 
14 For detailed discussion, Caterina Sganga, Propertizing European Copyright (Edward Elgar, 2018). 
15 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Official Journal C 326, 26/10/2012, P. 391–407, art 
17(2); This provision simply confirms that intellectual property is covered by the Charter’s general guarantee of 
property rights (art. 17(1)); See, Case C-70/10) Scarlet Extended v SABAM (2011) EU:C:2011:771, par. 43.; 
Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel v Constantin Film Verleih GmbH (2014) EU:C:2014:192, par. 61. 
16 See, for example, Case C-160/17, GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV (2016) EU:C:2016:644. 
17 See, Case C-277/10 Luksan v Van der Let (2012) EU:C:2012:65. 
18 For a discussion of the limitations of the right of property in this regard, see Alexander Peukert, The 
Fundamental Right to (Intellectual) Property and the Discretion of the Legislature at Research Handbook on 
Human Rights and Intellectual Property 132 (Christophe Geiger ed., Edward Elgar 2015). 
19 Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises 471 US 539, 558 (1985). 
a matter of theory.20 These have, however, had little effect in substantive doctrine, where the 
argument that freedom of expression encompasses a justiciable right not to speak, or a right 
not to speak in particular terms, has not been widely accepted.21 Similarly, while the rights of 
privacy and dignity have had an impact in some jurisdictions,22 their impact in copyright law 
has not been more generally recognized. 
 
The most likely foundations for the argument that creators are protected in human rights law 
therefore remain the rights protected under Article 27(2) of the UDHR and Article 15(1)(c) of 
the ICESCR. The text of the former has been set out in the introduction to this chapter above. 
Article 15(1)(c), which is based on Article 27(2), provides that: 
 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone: … 
(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting 
from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.23 
 
The rights set out in the UDHR are not directly enforceable.24 However, there is an enforcement 
mechanism for the rights protected under the ICESCR. Contracting states are obliged 
periodically to report on the measures they have taken to comply with the Convention and, 
where a state has ratified the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, a right of individual petition to 
the Committee on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights arises. The obligations imposed by 
“cultural rights”, such as Article 15(1)(c), are not equivalent to the civil and political rights 
protected under “first generation” rights instruments such as the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights or the European Convention on Human Rights, under which state 
                                                 
20 See, for example, L. Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, The Moral Right of Integrity – a Freedom of Integrity at vol. 2, New 
Directions in Copyright Law 128 (Fiona Macmillan ed., Edward Elgar 2006); For analysis of the claim that 
copyright is “the engine of free expression”, see Neil W. Netanel, Copyright’s Paradox 81-108 (Oxford University 
Press 2008). 
21 Although, for the acceptance of a comparable example based on the freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (art. 10), see the Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Case C-
516/17 Spiegel Online GmbH v Volker Beck (2019) EU:C:2019:16, par. 79. 
22 For discussion see Josef Drexl, Constitutional Protection of Authors’ Moral Rights in the European Union at 
Human Rights & Private Law: Privacy as Autonomy 159-176 (Katja S. Ziegler ed., Hart Publishing 2007). 
23 Art 15(1) as a whole provides that: 
 
“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone: 
(a) To take part in cultural life; 
(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications; 
(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.” 
 
Limitations imposed on the rights granted under the ICESCR are permissible, as long as certain general conditions 
are satisfied, see ICESCR, art. 4. 
24 Although it has been suggested that the UDHR has the force of customary international law, see Roberta 
Rosenthal Kwall, The Soul of Creativity: Forging a Moral Rights Law for the United States 133 (Stanford 
University Press 2010); Peter Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights 
Framework 40 University of California at Davis Law Review 1039, 1046 (2007). 
parties are required immediately to satisfy all protected rights.25 By contrast, it is recognized 
that a state’s ability to satisfy economic, social and cultural rights depends, to an extent, on its 
resources. Accordingly, the ICESCR generally imposes an obligation upon states progressively 
to realize rights such as the creators’ rights established under Article 15(1)(c).26 
 
The national reports filed by states in compliance with the ICESCR tend not to focus on Article 
15(1)(c) and no individual petitions based on that provision have yet been brought under the 
Protocol. Nevertheless, this absence of definitive guidance on the meaning of creators’ rights 
under the international human rights system has not served to deter claims that the rights 
granted under Article 27(2) and Article 15(1)(c) support the rights of authors under national 
and international copyright systems. Thus, for example, in its submission to the Human Rights 
Council’s Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights in 2014, the International Publishers 
Association wrote that: 
 
Copyright (understood as encompassing both economic and moral rights) is a 
concretisation of the human rights of creators: their freedom […] to create 
science, their freedom of expression ... It is our view that human rights and 
intellectual property rights are not only compatible, but also mutually 
supportive and interdependent. 27 
 
It is not only lobbyists who have stressed the close relationship between authors’ rights and 
creators’ rights. In her pioneering work on the legislative history of creators’ rights, Chapman 
described Article 27(2) and Article 15(1)(c) as giving rise to a “human right to intellectual 
property”.28 Bécourt has argued that the “Universal Declaration considers copyright to be a 
human right in itself, within the more general context of the right to culture”29 and Dietz and 
Françon have written that “…to attack copyright is to attack a human right, the highest and 
most venerable form of legal protection of human activity”.30 More recently, Minero has noted 
that at the “international level, copyright is considered a fundamental or human right in Art 27 
of the Universal Declaration of HR”.31  
                                                 
25 However, see the discussion of “core obligations” in section §25.02[B] below. 
26 For a brief summary of the obligations imposed, see Committee on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, Human 
Rights & Intellectual Property: Statement by the Committee on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, par. 11 (14 
Dec. 2001) E/C.12/2001/15. For a more detailed review of the institutional context of the relationship between 
intellectual property law and international human rights, see Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme W. Austin, Human 
Rights & Intellectual Property 1-89 (CUP 2011).   
27 Jens Bammel, Consultation on the Impact of Intellectual Property Regimes on the Enjoyment of the Right to 
Science and Culture, (15 Sept. 2014), 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/CulturalRights/ConsultationIntelectualproperty/International%20Publ
ishers%20Association.pdf (accessed 13 Jun. 2019). 
28 See, for example, Audrey R. Chapman, The Human Rights Implications of Intellectual Property Protection 
Journal of International Economic Law 861, 866 (2002). 
29 Daniel Bécourt, Copyright and Human Rights Copyright Bulletin 13, 14 (1998(3)). 
30 Adolph Dietz & André Françon, Copyright as a Human Right Copyright Bulletin 7, 8 (1998(3)). 
31 Gemma Minero, Intellectual Property Rights & Human Rights: Coinciding and Cooperating at Intellectual 
Property Law & Human Rights 163-184, 169 (Paul Torremans ed., 3rd ed, Wolters Kluwer, 2015); See also Paul 
Goldstein & Bernt Hugenholtz, International Copyright: Principles, Law & Practice 23 (3rd ed., Oxford 
   
Thus, it would appear that there is a relatively widely-held view that the creators’ rights 
protected under the international human rights system map closely onto the authors’ rights 
established in international and national copyright law. In its strongest form, this view suggests 
that the international human rights system provides a “right to copyright” in the exact, detailed 
sense established in copyright law. In reality, however, this position is difficult to sustain. 
National copyright systems vary significantly and it is difficult to see how creators’ rights can 
be linked closely with the detailed requirements of positive statutory law. It might more 
plausibly be claimed that creators’ rights require the implementation of the leading features, at 
least, of the international system of authors’ rights. Under such an interpretation, a state party 
to the UDHR and/or ICESCR might, for example, be obliged to ensure that all Berne 
Convention “authors” benefit from the core moral and economic rights granted under 
international copyright treaties for the full term of protection guaranteed under those treaties 
and that exceptions and limitations upon those rights are not unreasonably extensive.  
 
In this more general sense, then, can the equation between authors’ rights and creators’ rights 
be sustained? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to consider how creators’ rights 
have been interpreted in international human rights law. 
 
§25.02 Creator’s Rights as Human Rights 
 
The texts of Article 27(2) and Article 15(1)(c) suggest a connection with positive copyright 
law, but provide limited normative guidance on their interpretation. Furthermore, as suggested 
above, there is little to illuminate these provisions in the responses of the Committee on 
Economic, Social & Cultural Rights to national reports or, as yet, in responses to individual 
complaints under the Additional Protocol. Do the travaux préparatoires clarify the scope and 
effect of creators’ rights? 
 
[A] Travaux préparatoires 
 
The circumstances in which both Article 27(2) of the UDHR and Article 15(1)(c) of the 
ICESCR were agreed have been investigated in detail.32 Commentators on the legislative 
history of these provisions nevertheless tend to suggest that the travaux provide little guidance 
on the establishment of a consistent interpretation of creators’ rights in international human 
                                                 
University Press, 2013) 23; Jorgen Blomqvist, Primer on International Copyright and Related Rights 17 (Edward 
Elgar 2014). 
32 See, for example, Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent) 
217-222 (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press  1999; Audrey Chapman, Approaching Intellectual 
Property as a Human Right: Obligations Related to Article 15(1)(c) 35 Copyright Bulletin 4, 10-13(2001); Maria 
Green, Drafting History of the Article 15(1)(c) of the International Covenant (9 Oct. 2000) UN Doc 
E/C.12/2001/15; Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan (n 8) §8.05, 8.10 (Oxford University Press 2016); Peter Yu (n. 24) 
1039; Ragnar Adalsteinsson & Páll Thórhallson, Article 27 at The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: a 
Common Standard of Achievement (Gudmundur Alfredsson & Asbjorn Eide eds, Brill, 1999) 577-580. 
rights law.33 It is clear that the inclusion of creators’ rights in both the UDHR and the ICESCR 
was controversial,34 that Article 27(2) was a disputed addition during the drafting of the UDHR 
and that there was no automatic carry-over of that provision into the ICESCR. Some of the 
states which promoted the inclusion of creators’ rights in international human rights law were 
clearly motivated by a desire to strengthen international copyright law35 and, in particular, 
some seem to have been keen to bolster the patchy protection available for moral rights at an 
international level.36 There is also evidence that some states were motivated, at least in part, by 
a desire to influence the ongoing negotiation of international copyright agreements.37  
However, there was also considerable resistance to the inclusion of creators’ rights in 
international human rights law, on the grounds that creators’ rights were not human rights38 or 
that the issues raised by authors’ rights were simply too complex to be resolved within a human 
rights framework and were better handled in the domain of international copyright law.39 
Furthermore, a number of states noted that creators’ rights, as agreed, were to be read alongside 
both the other elements of Article 27 and Article 15 that guaranteed access to culture40 and the 
rights protected under other Articles of the Convention.41 
 
There is thus no doubt that the creators’ rights provided under Article 27(2) and Article 15(1)(c) 
are historically connected to the structures of authors’ rights law. However, given their 
contested origins, the nature of this relationship remains relatively obscure. Most importantly, 
it is difficult to establish the scope and effect of creators’ rights without understanding more 
about the relationship between those rights and other elements of Article 27 and Article 15(1), 
at least. The travaux give little guidance on this issue. Fortunately, however, further sources of 
interpretative assistance have subsequently become available. Two UN human rights bodies, 
the Committee on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights (CESCR) and the Human Rights 
Council have sought to clarify the nature and scope of creators’ rights through the provision of 
interpretative guidance. In 2006, the CESCR issued “General Comment No 17: The Right of 
Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from 
Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of which He is the Author”.42  In 2014, the 
United Nations’ Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights 
                                                 
33 See, for example, Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan (n. 8) §8.07; Peter Yu (n. 24) 1050. 
34 Grosse Ruse-Khan (n. 8) 805; Peter Yu (n. 24) 1054; Roberta Rosenthal Kwall (n. 24) 134; See also, UN Human 
Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, Farida Shaheed, Copyright 
Policy & the Right to Science & Culture, par. 30, (24 Dec. 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/28/57. 
35 Johannes Morsink (n. 32) 221. 
36 Peter Yu (n. 24) 1039, 1081-1083. 
37 See Audrey Chapman (n. 32) 4, 10. 
38 Johannes Morsink (n. 32) 221. 
39 Maria Green (n. 32) 8. 
40 For discussion of the importance of balancing the various rights protected under art. 15(1), see Lea Shaver & 
Caterina Sganga, The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life: on Copyright & Human Rights Wisconsin International 
Law Journal 637-662 (2010); Audrey Chapman (n. 32) 4, 13; Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan (n. 8) §8.10. 
41 Ragnar Adalsteinsson & Páll Thórhallson (n. 32) 575-596, 580. 
42 Committee on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, General Comment No 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit 
from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic 
Production of which He is the Author, (12 Jan. 2006) UN Doc E/C12/GC/17 (General Comment 17).  
issued her report on Copyright Policy and the Right to Science and Culture.43 Together, these 
offer important guidance on the interpretation of creators’ rights and have been described as an 
“emerging jurisprudence”.44 It is to these documents which we now turn. 
 
[B] General Comment No 17 of the Committee on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights 
 
By the 1990s, the negotiation of new international intellectual property agreements (TRIPS, in 
particular) had given rise to considerable disquiet in some quarters. It was argued that the 
ratcheting-up of intellectual property protection (including copyright) under such agreements 
threatened important public interests, including access to medicines and to education. It was in 
this climate of challenge to international norm-setting in intellectual property law that the 
CESCR decided that further clarification of the concept of creators’ rights in international 
human rights law was required. A “preliminary contribution” was made in the Statement on 
Human Rights & Intellectual Property (“2001 Statement”), which aimed to identify key human 
rights principles deriving from Article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR and, in particular, to distinguish 
those principles from those applicable in intellectual property law.45 This statement notes that 
the realms of trade, finance and investment are not exempt from the requirements of 
international human rights law and calls upon bodies such as the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) to take appropriate account 
of the rights protected under the ICESCR.46 It distinguishes emphatically between human rights 
(such as creators’ rights), which are described as “fundamental as they derive from the human 
person as such”, and intellectual property rights, which are instrumental policy tools.47 It also 
stresses the importance of non-discrimination and the consequent need to pay particular 
attention to the most disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups in society, at 
national and international levels. In general terms, the 2001 Statement notes the need to 
maintain a balance between the two aspects of Article 15 of the ICESCR: 
 
On the one hand, article 15.1 (a) and (b) recognizes the right of everyone to take 
part in cultural life and to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its 
applications. On the other hand, article 15.1 (c) recognizes the right of everyone 
to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from 
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author. 
When adopting and reviewing intellectual property systems, States should bear 
in mind the need to strike a balance between those concurrent Covenant 
provisions.48 
                                                 
43 UN Doc A/HRC/28/57 (n. 33). 
44 Graeme W. Austin (n. 8) 405, 418.  
45 Committee on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, Human Rights & Intellectual Property: Statement by the 
Committee on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, (14 Dec. 2001) E/C.12/2001/15 (2001 Statement); For 
discussion, see Audrey Chapman (n. 28) 861. 
46 2001 Statement, §3, 9; It also declares that all those affected by intellectual property regimes should be entitled 
to participate in decision-making process in an active and informed manner. 
47 id. §6. 
48 id., §17. 
 Furthermore, it notes that state parties to the ICESCR were not only under a duty progressively 
to realize the right protected under Article 15(1)(c), but also came under certain obligations 
that had immediate effect under that provision, including “core obligations”.49  
 
The CESCR followed up the 2001 Statement with more detailed interpretative guidance on 
creators’ rights in “General Comment No 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the 
Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or 
Artistic Production of which He is the Author” (General Comment 17).50 This document, which 
has been referred to as a “key point of reference for analysis of the normative content of Article 
15(1)(c)”,51 restates the general principles set out in the 2001 Statement. In particular, it 
reiterates the distinction between creators’ rights, which are inherent to human beings and 
intellectual property rights, which are instrumental policy tools.52 It also notes again that  
creators’ rights must be balanced against other important human rights and public interests.53 
Additionally, it provides further detail on the normative content of Article 15(1)(c), noting, for 
example, that creators’ rights are granted to natural persons (including groups of natural 
persons)54 and that legal entities, while recognized as proprietors of rights in intellectual 
property law, are not covered by Article 15(1)(c).55 Concerning the nature of the cultural 
productions covered by creators’ rights, General Comment 17 explains that “any scientific, 
literary or artistic production” is a broader category than the “literary and artistic works” 
protected under the Berne Convention56 and encompasses “scientific publications and 
innovations, including knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local 
communities” and “performances and oral traditions”.57  
 
By reference to Article 27(2) of the UDHR,58 General Comment 17 identifies the “moral 
interests” of authors as a particularly important aspect of the creators’ rights established under 
Article 15(1)(c).  It suggests that these interests are defined in a manner which aligns very 
closely with the moral rights guaranteed under the Berne Convention and include both a right 
                                                 
49 id., §11. 
50 General Comment 17; For discussion, see Hans M. Haugen, General Comment No. 17 on “Author’s Rights” 
10(1) Journal of World Intellectual Property 53 (2007); Laurence R Helfer, Toward a Human Rights Framework 
for IP University of California, Davis Law Rev 971 (2007); Graeme W. Austin & Amy G. Zavidow, Copyright 
Law Reform through a Human Rights Lens at Intellectual Property Law & Human Rights 303-333 (Paul 
Torremans ed., , 3rd ed., Wolters Kluwer 2015). 
51 Laurence R Helfer and Graeme W. Austin (n. 26) 172; Although it has been noted that the 2001 Statement and 
the General Comment are interpretative, rather than binding. See Laurence R. Helfer (n. 50) 988; Henning Grosse 
Ruse-Khan (n. 8) §8.12.  
52 General Comment 17, §1. 
53 id. 35. 
54  General Comment 17, §8, 32; The rights of indigenous persons are a particular issue of concern for the 
Committee.  
55 id. 7, 8. 
56 See, Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (24 Jul. 1971), TRT/BERNE/002, art. 
2. 
57 General Comment 17, §9. 
58 id. 12. 
to attribution and an integrity right.59 At the same time, it explains the concept of “material 
interests” in a manner which is not so obviously aligned with international copyright norms, 
stating that: 
  
The term of protection of material interests under article 15, paragraph 1(c), 
need not extend over the entire lifespan of an author. Rather, the purpose of 
enabling authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living can also be achieved 
through one-time payments or by vesting an author, for a limited period of time, 
with the exclusive right to exploit his scientific, literary or artistic production.60 
 
According to General Comment 17, state parties to the ICESCR are obliged to ensure that 
remedies for violation of creators’ moral and material interests are available, accessible and 
efficient.61 They must also make sure that access to such remedies is provided in a non-
discriminatory manner and that particular attention is paid to the interests of disadvantaged and 
marginalised groups.62 Any limitations upon the rights of authors must pursue a legitimate aim 
and must be proportionate (in line with ICESCR, Article 4)63 and may be accompanied by an 
obligation to provide compensation to authors.64 
 
In addition to this outline of the standards of protection required under Article 15(1)(c), General 
Comment 17 seeks to elaborate the nature of the obligations placed upon state parties to the 
ICESCR. As noted in the previous section of this chapter, in line with other economic, social 
and cultural rights protected under international human rights instruments, creators’ rights are 
subject to an obligation of progressive realization, an obligation which is sensitive to the 
resource constraints of individual states. Within this framework, states have duties to respect, 
protect and fulfill creators’ rights.65 The duty to respect precludes states from infringing the 
moral interests of creators and from unjustifiably infringing their material interests.66 The 
obligation to protect those interests encompasses a duty to safeguard creators against third 
parties, including a duty to ensure compensation for unlicensed use. The obligation to fulfill 
the requirements of Article 15(1)(c) requires states to maintain judicial, administrative or other 
appropriate remedies for creators, to facilitate the formation of professional and other 
associations representing the moral and material interests of authors and to promote the 
involvement of creators in decision-making on policies having an impact on their  interests.67 
General Comment 17 also confirms that Article 15(1)(c) imposes certain immediately effective 
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obligations, including a prohibition on measures that reduce the existing level of protection 
available to authors without particular justification68 and a duty to satisfy certain current “core 
obligations”, which are set out in the following terms:69 
 
(a) To take legislative and other necessary steps to ensure the effective 
protection of the moral and material interests of authors; 
(b) To protect the rights of authors to be recognized as the creators of their 
scientific, literary and artistic productions and to object to any distortion, 
mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, 
their productions that would be prejudicial to their honour or reputation; 
(c) To respect and protect the basic material interests of authors resulting from 
their scientific, literary or artistic productions, which are necessary to enable 
those authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living; 
(d) To ensure equal access, particularly for authors belonging to disadvantaged 
and marginalized groups, to administrative, judicial or other appropriate 
remedies enabling authors to seek and obtain redress in case their moral and 
material interests have been infringed; 
(e) To strike an adequate balance between the effective protection of the moral 
and material interests of authors and States parties’ obligations in relation to the 
rights to food, health and education, as well as the rights to take part in cultural 
life and to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, or any 
other right recognized in the Covenant. 
 
It is noteworthy that, while the terminology employed to describe the core obligation to protect 
the moral interests of attribution and integrity is closely aligned with the text of Article 6bis, 
Berne Convention, the equivalent obligation to respect and protect the material interests of 
authors is more qualified, as it is limited to “basic” material interests, being those which are 
“necessary to enable those authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living”. 
 
[C] Report of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights, 2014 
 
Following a 2009 Resolution, the United Nations’ Human Rights Council appointed Farida 
Shaheed, as “independent expert in the field of cultural rights”70. In 2012, the title of “Special 
Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights” was conferred upon her and the period of her mandate 
was extended.71 In the course of this mandate, Shaheed produced ten linked reports on various 
aspects of the cultural rights protected under the international human rights acquis.72 In 
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eds., Edward Elgar 2017); Farid Shaheed, Introductory Remarks by the Special Rapporteur at Intellectual Property 
December 2014, she issued her “Copyright Policy and the Right to Science and Culture” 
report,73 which was intended to provide further clarification of the relationship between 
authors’ rights and the creators’ rights protected under the UDHR and the ICESCR. The 
terminology employed in her report is significant. Shaheed describes the rights set out in 
Article 27 of the UDHR and Article 15(1) of the ICESCR collectively as the “right to science 
and culture.”. This concept encompasses both aspects of those rights: on the one hand, the right 
to take part in cultural life and to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications74 
and, on the other, the right of authors to the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from their scientific, literary or artistic productions.75 The choice of terminology 
emphasizes the linked nature of the different elements of the “right to science and culture” and, 
in so doing distinguishes this right yet more clearly from the rights granted under intellectual 
property laws. The aspect of the right to science and culture which has been referred to above 
as “creators’ rights” (i.e., the rights protected under Article 27(2) of the UDHR and Article 
15(1))(c) of the ICESCR) is described by Shaheed as the right to “protection of authorship”.76 
 
While building on the conclusions of General Comment 17,77 the Special Rapporteur explores 
the relationship between creators’ rights and copyright in a much more detailed and discursive 
manner than the earlier document. Having explained the “dual aspects of cultural participation 
and protection of authorship”,78 Shaheed emphasizes concerns about inequity and lack of 
transparency in the making of international copyright law and forcefully reiterates the 
distinction between creators’ rights and authors’ rights:  
 
It is sometimes claimed that intellectual property rights are human rights, or 
that [Art 15(1)(c)] recognizes a human right to protection of intellectual 
property along the lines set out by the TRIPS Agreement and other intellectual 
property treaties. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has 
stressed that this equation is false and misleading. Some elements of intellectual 
property protection are indeed required — or at least strongly encouraged — by 
reference to the right to science and culture. Other elements of contemporary 
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intellectual property laws go beyond what the right to protection of authorship 
requires, and may even be incompatible with the right to science and culture.79 
 
Again, it is emphasized that creators’ rights exist for the benefit of human beings.80 On this 
basis, it is suggested that creators’ rights are aligned with the personality-based, “moral rights” 
philosophy of civil law states such as France and Germany.81 The “moral interests” protected 
under Article 27(2) of the UDHR and Article 15(1)(c) are explicitly identified with the rights 
required under Article 6bis of the Berne Convention.82 However, in keeping with the dual 
conception of the right to science and culture, such “moral interests” are also considered 
potentially to cover the interest in the creative re-use of others’ works, such as in parody.83  
 
In the case of material interests, the Special Rapporteur identifies the problem of power 
relations in the relationship between human authors and the corporate bodies with whom 
authors enter into contractual arrangements.84 She suggests that the introduction of author-
protective rules, such as unwaivable “reversion rights”, droit de suite and statutory licensing, 
where these do not already exist, might serve to address this problem.85 She also emphasizes 
that the introduction of exceptions and limitations, coupled with a right to remuneration, might 
satisfy the dual aspects of the right to science and culture in a nuanced manner.86 At the same 
time, it is made very clear that authors’ material interests may be protected by means other than 
copyright; for example, through minimum wage protections, collective bargaining and the 
adoption of policies promoting the cultural sector and the right to science and culture.87 By 
comparison with the lengthy term of protection required under national and international 
copyright laws, it is suggested that creators’ material interests may be secured through 
relatively short-term measures.88  
 
Shaheed also states that copyright exceptions and limitations have the potential to play a 
particularly important role as valuable tools in securing the “cultural participation” aspect of 
the right to science and culture (supporting, for example, follow-on creativity, education, 
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access to works for people with a disability and translation into non-dominant languages), 
while also providing authors with income through statutory compensation mechanisms.89 
Without being entirely prescriptive, she floats a number of potential developments that might 
serve the right to science and culture in this area – the introduction of flexible, fair use-type 
limitations90 and mandatory limitations91 in national laws and the negotiation of further 
Marrakesh-like treaties relating to libraries, archives and education at international level.92 She 
also suggests that open licensing systems, and support for those systems by public bodies, have 
considerable potential to assist in satisfying state obligations under the right to science and 
culture.93  
 
Human rights often have important procedural aspects. The Special Rapporteur provides a 
number of examples of procedural initiatives which she considers to have the capacity to bring 
copyright law and the right to science and culture into closer alignment.94 She also advocates 
more transparent, participatory copyright law-making processes, the application of human 
rights assessment processes to legislation and the adoption of human rights-compliant canons 
of legal interpretation.95 Measures to combat infringement in a digital environment, such as 
criminal sanctions and website blocking, are not to be adopted where they would have a 
disproportionate impact on other human rights such as the right of freedom of expression.96 
 
§25.03 Universalism, Pluralism or Isolationism? – Author’s rights and creator’s rights 
 
What does this examination of the meaning of creators’ rights within the human rights 
community tell us about the relationship between these rights and the law of authors’ rights, at 
international and national level? First, it seems abundantly clear that any argument that 
creators’ rights underpin and justify the copyright system as it stands currently is misconceived. 
Claims, by lobbyists, or others, that creators’ rights give rise to a straightforward “right to 
copyright”, are simply wrong.97 Nevertheless, even though General Comment 17 and the 
Special Rapporteur go out of their way to highlight the fact that creators’ rights cannot be 
equated with authors’ rights, there is clearly an important link between the rights protected 
under the positive law of the copyright system and the rights protected under Article 27(2) of 
the UDHR and Article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR. This is apparent from the text of those 
provisions, from the historical records of their negotiation and from General Comment 17 and 
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the report of the Special Rapporteur themselves.98 However, the exact nature of this link 
remains uncertain.  
 
In these circumstances, can it be said that any aspects of the legal system for the protection of 
authors’ rights are required under international human rights law?99 Conversely, is it possible 
to say that any features of the existing system are inconsistent with creators’ rights, as 
conceived within the UN’s human rights bodies?100 In considering the first of these questions, 
the strongest claim can be made in relation to moral rights.101  It has been seen above that there 
is a clear linkage between the “moral interests” that must be protected as an element within 
creators’ rights and the moral rights required under the Berne Convention and protected in the 
authors’ rights laws of most jurisdictions. The desire to promote the broader adoption of 
positive moral rights protection was an instrumental factor at the time that the creators’ rights 
provisions of the international human rights documents were negotiated. It has also been 
demonstrated that both General Comment 17 and Farida Shaheed’s report connect the “moral 
interests” aspect of creators’ rights closely with the rights of attribution and integrity required 
under the Berne Convention. Beyond this, however, the human rights documents do not 
provide clear guidance on the precise shape that national moral rights regimes should take. It 
is not clear, for example, whether the author-centric focus of creators’ rights militates in favor 
of a more generous approach to moral rights than that adopted in many common law 
jurisdictions, requiring legal protection against unauthorized divulgation of a work or a broader 
concept of infringement under the integrity right.102 Nevertheless, in this area, it seems possible 
to discern the outline requirements of the obligation to protect creators’ rights and it therefore 
seems reasonable to argue that creators’ rights underpin the integrity and attribution rights in 
national copyright laws. Accordingly, it might be difficult for a state that provides no, or only 
weak, moral rights protection to argue that it has complied with its obligation to protect 
creators’ rights under international human rights law.103 
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In the case of creators’ material interests, the picture is nowhere near as clear. There is no 
obvious terminological link between the texts of Article 27(2) of the UDHR and Article 
15(1)(c) of the ICESCR and the exclusive rights provided to creators in the international law 
of authors’ rights. Furthermore, as noted above, both General Comment 17 and the report of 
the Special Rapporteur emphasize that states are entitled to protect creators’ material interests 
by mechanisms other than exclusive rights. However, even here, it can be suggested that there 
is at least some form of link between the existing structures of positive authors’ rights law and 
creators’ rights. The detailed focus on the contours of substantive copyright law in the Special 
Rapporteur’s report implicitly suggest that states may legitimately seek to secure the material 
interests of creators through an appropriately calibrated law of authors’ rights, as long as that 
body of rules is applied in a non-discriminatory manner.104 Indeed, it might even be suggested 
that it is assumed that this is the methodology that states will generally employ in protecting 
creators’ rights. Nevertheless, there is little or nothing in the human rights materials that 
dictates the scope of authors’ exclusive rights, as long as effective support for creators’ material 
interests is provided. 
 
It has plausibly been suggested that, in order to comply with their obligation to secure creators’ 
rights, states must take a stricter approach to exceptions and limitations to those rights than is 
permissible under the so-called “three-step step” established in international copyright law.105 
However, the creators’ rights protected in human rights law are much more narrowly drawn 
than the exclusive rights operating in copyright law and, accordingly, it is difficult to draw 
meaningful conclusions from the distinction between the two proportionality tests. 
Furthermore, the focus on access to culture in both General Comment 17 and the report of the 
Special Rapporteur suggest that the space for exceptions and limitations in copyright law ought 
to be expanded rather than restricted under the influence of creators’ rights. 
 
Having thus sketched what can be said with any certainty about the relationship between 
creators’ rights and the substantive rules of authors’ rights regimes, it is important to pause for 
a moment to consider procedural issues. General Comment 17 makes it clear that, whatever its 
form, the legal protection of the moral and material interests of creators must be effective.106 It 
is also clear that such protection must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner107 and that 
particular regard must be paid to the interests of disadvantaged persons.108 It has been 
suggested that these requirements may support the prohibition on formal preconditions for 
protection that forms an important element of the current international system for the protection 
of authors’ rights.109 They may, at the same time, challenge the compatibility of certain other 
aspects of the current international (and national) structure of authors’ rights law. From a 
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human rights perspective, the fact that the protection of a copyright work depends to some 
extent on the nationality of its author seems difficult to justify. For example, in the United 
Kingdom, an Iranian author may not be able to exercise her authorial rights in a manner that 
supports her moral and material interests, while an Australian author may be able to do so in 
comparable circumstances. It seems unlikely that the creators’ rights of the Iranian author are 
adequately protected.110  Similarly, while international copyright law generally prohibits 
contracting states from discriminating against the nationals of other contracting parties, it does 
not prohibit discrimination against a state’s own nationals. Again, it appears difficult to justify 
the potential consequences of this rule from a human rights perspective.111 
 
§25.05 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to examine the nature of the relationship between authors’ rights, as 
established under international, regional and national copyright laws, and the creators’ rights 
protected under international human rights law. In particular, it has considered whether the two 
regimes support one another and/or whether there are any aspects of the current copyright 
system which are difficult to reconcile with creators’ rights. It has been demonstrated that, 
while there are clear connections between the two bodies of rules, their precise relationship has 
yet to be determined. For this reason, many of the copyright reform proposals advanced on the 
supposed foundation of creators’ rights (including some of the Special Rapporteur’s more 
detailed suggestions) are unconvincingly speculative. It is certainly possible to understand the 
general direction in which fuller recognition of creators’ rights would be likely to lead 
copyright law. It would favor a human author-centric system of authors’ rights that provides 
significant space for the public interest in access to culture and follow-on creativity. However, 
there are very few policy outcomes which can clearly be described as dictated, or precluded, 
by creators’ rights. The substantive requirements of Article 27(2) of the UDHR and Article 
15(1)(c) of the ISESCR are not yet sufficiently clearly defined to support such detailed claims. 
If creator’s rights are to have a more fully integrated influence on the legal structures protecting 
authors’ right in future, their content will need to be plotted in greater detail. Many states have 
constitutional rights that draw specifically on Article 27(2) of the UDHR and Article 15(1)(c) 
of the ICESCR. Jurisprudence on those provisions may shed interesting light on the potential 
application of the concept of creators’ rights in specific situations.112 In future, responses to 
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individual complaints under the Additional Protocol, may also serve to flesh out the scope and 
requirements of international human rights law in this area. 
 
The gulf between creators’ rights and authors’ rights is not purely doctrinal, of course. There 
are important institutional impediments to the further integration of the two legal regimes. The 
response to the Special Rapporteur’s report on “Copyright Policy and the Right to Science and 
Culture” was indicative. 113  The critical stance adopted by Shaheed was welcomed by some.114 
However, it was met with hostility by groups representing right-holders and by states that have 
historically dominated the policy-making arena in intellectual property law.115 The report itself 
appears to have had negligible impact on the institutions within which copyright policy is 
determined. It is difficult to escape the sense that authors’ rights and creators’ rights occupy 
distinct institutional spheres. Within human rights culture, although human rights scholars have 
written very little about Article 27(2) of the UDHR and Article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR, it is 
understood that there is an inconsistency between the requirements of creators’ rights and the 
positive law of authors’ rights and that creators’ rights ought to prevail. By contrast, within 
copyright culture, it is often assumed that international human rights law provides a “right to 
copyright”.116 The leading texts on author’s rights have next to nothing to say about creators’ 
rights, even where such discussion might have been expected.117 If a more pluralist 
international copyright acquis is ever to be established, these two spheres will need to be drawn 
more closely together. 
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